Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Defamation               –      or libel or slander or intrigue against honor

Fraud                        –      or estafa or swindling

Physical Injuries       -       including consummated, frustrated and attempted

homicide, murder, parricide, infanticide – so long as there was physical injury.

The term “physical injuries” is used in the foregoing article in its generic sense and has been interpreted to include death. It was held in Carandang vs. Santiago and Valenton, 97 Phil. 94, that the term “physical injuries” should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries.

CESAR M. CARANDANG vs. VICENTE SANTIAGO 

G.R No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

Facts

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the order of Judge Vicente Santiago, regarding his suspension of the civil case filed by petitioner Cesar Carandang to Tomas Valenton Sr. and Tomas Valenton Jr. to await the result of the criminal case also filed by petitioner against the defendants.

In the criminal case, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill. So the question arises whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical injuries in the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or not.

Issue

        Whether or not the respondent Judge committed an error in suspending the trial

of the civil case.

Held

The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.

A parallel case arose in that of Bixby vs Sioux City, 164 N. W. 641, 643. In that case, the appellant sought to take his case from the scope of the statute by pointing out that inasmuch as notice is required where the cause of action is founded on injury to the person, it has no application when the damages sought are for the death of the person. The court ruled that a claim to recover for death resulting from personal injury is as certainly "founded on injury to the person" as would be a claim to recover damages for a non-fatal injury resulting in a crippled body.

For the foregoing considerations, we find that the respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil case, and his order to that affect is hereby revoked, and he is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case without awaiting the result of the pending criminal case.

*****

In Marcelo Jervoso, et al. vs. People and CA, G.R. No. 89306, September 13, 1990, the Supreme Court also said that the term “physical injuries’’ in Article 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated, frustrated or attempted homicide.

MARCELO JERVOSO, et al. vs PEOPLE AND COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 89306, September 13, 1990

Facts

        The victim Rogelio Jervoso was going towards the store of the spouses Marcelo Jervoso and Norma Closa for the purpose of buying bread. While said eyewitness was about four meters distance from the store, he saw Rogelio Jervoso walking back and forth in front of the store and had his back turned away from Marcelo when the latter pulled a bolo from his waist and stabbed Rogelio at the back. After being wounded, Rogelio ran away, but was already fallen face down inside Mrs. Olmedo’s yard when Marcelo and his wife Norma catches-up with him. There, Marcelo stabbed Rogelio’s back again and Norma struck the fallen Rogelio with a stone she picked-up. The victim was brought to Abuyog General Hospital where he later expired.

        In his defense, Marcelo Jervoso declared that Rogelio Jervoso entered his office without knocking and arrogantly asked him about the lands he was possesing and that he told Rogelio to come back the next day so that both of them can see his adoptive mother Afra Diaz who can enlighten Rogelio. Marcelo then went outside and was stabbed by Rogelio on his left back part of his upper arm. He ran towards the front yard of Mrs. Olmedo and was intercepted by Marcelo who lunged at him and delivered another stabbing blow but was able to get hold of the right wrist holding the deadly weapon and wrest it from Rogelio’s hold by twisting his right hand. While Marcelo is still pinned by Rogelio against the concrete fence, Marcelo delivered two stabbing blows and pushed Rogelio who fell to the ground.

        The Court of Appeals ruled that the penalty be imposed on appellant Marcelo Jervoso, should be imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prison mayor as minimum to 12 years of prison mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso in the amount of P30,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Issue

        Whether or not the petitioners should pay the indemnity of P30,000 to the heirs of Regelio Jervoso despite the reservation by the said heirs of their right to file a separate civil action against the accused, which they did file in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Held  

        The filing of a separate civil action for damages against the accused by the heirs of the decease victim is authorized under Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 is used in generic sense. It included consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide (Majeda vs. Cruz, 126 SCRA 293, cited Vol I, p. 62 Civil Code, 1990., Ed by R.C Aquino). Having reserved and filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the award.

*****

No Need to reserve independent civil action.

Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court requires the action to be reserved;

“Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.— (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. “The Reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.”

“Section 2. Independent civil action. –– In the cases provided for in Article 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the

criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.”

“Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. –– In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.”

Note: 

·         The foundation of Article 33 is the Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that every person who is criminally liable shall also be civilly liable.

·         There is NO NEED TO RESERVE the right to prosecute the civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.

·         While the Rules of Court require reservation, what is reserved is the right to file a civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the crime charged as a felony; otherwise it is deemed filed with the criminal action.

·         The PURPOSE of RESERVING of civil action is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.

Independent civil action; when deemed not barred despite intervention by private prosecutor.

ZENAIDA CRUZ REYES vs HON. JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIO-DIY, et al.,

G.R No. L-71914, January 29, 1986  

Facts

        Cristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. The aggrieved party therein was Zenaida Cruz Reyes, the herein petitioner. In said case Zenaida Cruz Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor, Atty. Barayang. The accused pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced by the Court to a fine of P50.00. Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party was unable to present evidence to prove damages against the accused. Neither was she able to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Instead, she filed a new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the Regional Trial Court for damages arising from the defamatory words uttered against her by Cristina Malicsi which was the subject of the information filed against the latter for intriguing against honor.

        The trial Court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the civil case relying principally upon Roa vs Dela Cruz,  107 Phil 8;

When the offended party actually intervenes in the criminal action by appearing therein through a private prosecutor for the purpose of recovering indemnity for damages, he is deemed to have waived his right to file a separate civil action for damages if he failed to make a reservation therefor; thus, if the court did not enter a judgment for civil liability against the accused in the criminal case because the offended party failed to submit evidence of damages therein and he did not file any motion for reconsideration or did not appeal from said judgment, the judgment becomes res judicata, and an independent civil action under Art. 33 of the New Civil Code cannot be brought by said offended party anymore

Issue

        Whether or not the rule laid down in Roa Case should govern in dismissing the civil case filed by Zenaida Cruz Reyes.

Held

No. In the present case, however, while it is true that petitioner, the aggrieved party in the criminal case against private respondent Cristina Malicsi for the crime of intriguing against honor, was represented by a private prosecutor for the purpose of proving damages, the unexpected plea of guilt by the accused and her being sentenced immediately to a fine of P50.00 prevented petitioner from proving her claim for damages and making a reservation to file a separate civil action. More in point, therefore, is the case of Meneses vs. Luat, 12 SCRA 454, and it is the ruling in the said case rather than the Roa case which is controlling in the present case, Like in the present case in the Meneses case the aggrieved party was also represented by a private prosecutor, but the case did not proceed to trial as the accused upon arraignment pleaded guilty.

Upon authority, therefore, of Meneses vs. Luat We find and so hold that the mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private respondents did not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Because the accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in support of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil action.

Moreover, the failure of petitioner to make a reservation to file a separate civil action did not foreclose her right to file said separate complaint for damages. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for damages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case and such reservation is not necessary.

Outcome of criminal case is inconsequential.

·         ·         The outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is inconsequential and will be of no moment in a civil action for damages based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.

·        *  Civil liability may still be pursued in a separate civil action but it must be predicated on a source of obligation other than a delict, except when by statutory provision an independent civil action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil Code. 

Sources: 
Family Code of the Philippines by Judge Albano