Proximate Cause

- An act from which an injury results as a natural, direct, uninterrupted consequence and without which the injury would not have occurred.

Proximate cause is the primary cause of an injury. It is not necessarily the closest cause in time or space nor the first event that sets in motion a sequence of events leading to an injury. Proximate cause produces particular, foreseeable consequences without the intervention of any independent or unforeseeable cause. It is also known as legal cause.

To help determine the proximate cause of an injury in Negligence or other tort cases, courts have devised the "but for" or"sine qua non" rule, which considers whether the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's negligent act. A finding that an injury would not have occurred but for a defendant's act establishes that the particular act or omission is the proximate cause of the harm, but it does not necessarily establish liability since a variety of other factors can come into play in tort actions.

Some jurisdictions apply the "substantial factor" formula to determine proximate cause. This rule considers whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in producing the harm. If the act was a substantial factor in bringing about the damage, then the defendant will be held liable unless she can raise a sufficient defense to rebut the claims.

Source(s): 

https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/proximate+cause

Family Code of the Philippines

Title I: Marriage

Chapter 1: Requisites of Marriage

Article 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years (18) or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. (54a)

Rules on validity of marriage

·         The marriage is valid if there is consent of the parents. Without the consent of the parents, the marriage would only be voidable. If it is without the consent of the parties, the marriage is void.

·         If the parties to a marriage are below the ages of eighteen (18), even with the consent of their parents, the marriage would still be void. This is because they lack the legal capacity to marry.

·         Note that the impediment referred to in Article 37 of the Family Code pertains to blood relationship between the contracting parties, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

·         If a grandfather marries a granddaughter, the marriage is void because it is incestuous. This is true even if the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate and no matter how far the relationship is. As long as the relationship is in the direct line, the marriage is void.

·         The impediments in Article 38 of the Family Code also make the marriage void by reason of public policy

Reason for invalidity if below 18 of age.

·         Extreme youth may not lend stability to the marriage and the family.

·         Marriages have failed, families have been broken because of extreme irresponsibility of the spouses due to age. So, the law requires some degree of maturity.

Illustration:

A and B, both 17 years of age, Filipino citizens, got married. The marriage is void because of lack of capacity to marry. This is true even if the marriage was celebrated abroad where the marriage was valid there as such. The reason is that, the capacity of Filipino citizens to marry is determined by Philippine law and not the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated. (See Art. 15, New Civil Code).

Suppose A in the problem above was 27 years old and B was only 17 years of age, the marriage would still be void because the law requires that both contracting parties must have legal capacity to contract marriage.

Gender Requirement

·         The law requires that the parties to a marriage must be a male and a female. This reason is obvious, for two males or two females cannot reproduce.

·         It must be remembered that no less than the law itself says that marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. (Art. 1, Family Code).

Sources: 

Family Code of the Philippines by Judge Albano

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Defamation               –      or libel or slander or intrigue against honor

Fraud                        –      or estafa or swindling

Physical Injuries       -       including consummated, frustrated and attempted

homicide, murder, parricide, infanticide – so long as there was physical injury.

The term “physical injuries” is used in the foregoing article in its generic sense and has been interpreted to include death. It was held in Carandang vs. Santiago and Valenton, 97 Phil. 94, that the term “physical injuries” should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries.

CESAR M. CARANDANG vs. VICENTE SANTIAGO 

G.R No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

Facts

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the order of Judge Vicente Santiago, regarding his suspension of the civil case filed by petitioner Cesar Carandang to Tomas Valenton Sr. and Tomas Valenton Jr. to await the result of the criminal case also filed by petitioner against the defendants.

In the criminal case, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill. So the question arises whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical injuries in the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or not.

Issue

        Whether or not the respondent Judge committed an error in suspending the trial

of the civil case.

Held

The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.

A parallel case arose in that of Bixby vs Sioux City, 164 N. W. 641, 643. In that case, the appellant sought to take his case from the scope of the statute by pointing out that inasmuch as notice is required where the cause of action is founded on injury to the person, it has no application when the damages sought are for the death of the person. The court ruled that a claim to recover for death resulting from personal injury is as certainly "founded on injury to the person" as would be a claim to recover damages for a non-fatal injury resulting in a crippled body.

For the foregoing considerations, we find that the respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil case, and his order to that affect is hereby revoked, and he is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case without awaiting the result of the pending criminal case.

*****

In Marcelo Jervoso, et al. vs. People and CA, G.R. No. 89306, September 13, 1990, the Supreme Court also said that the term “physical injuries’’ in Article 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated, frustrated or attempted homicide.

MARCELO JERVOSO, et al. vs PEOPLE AND COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 89306, September 13, 1990

Facts

        The victim Rogelio Jervoso was going towards the store of the spouses Marcelo Jervoso and Norma Closa for the purpose of buying bread. While said eyewitness was about four meters distance from the store, he saw Rogelio Jervoso walking back and forth in front of the store and had his back turned away from Marcelo when the latter pulled a bolo from his waist and stabbed Rogelio at the back. After being wounded, Rogelio ran away, but was already fallen face down inside Mrs. Olmedo’s yard when Marcelo and his wife Norma catches-up with him. There, Marcelo stabbed Rogelio’s back again and Norma struck the fallen Rogelio with a stone she picked-up. The victim was brought to Abuyog General Hospital where he later expired.

        In his defense, Marcelo Jervoso declared that Rogelio Jervoso entered his office without knocking and arrogantly asked him about the lands he was possesing and that he told Rogelio to come back the next day so that both of them can see his adoptive mother Afra Diaz who can enlighten Rogelio. Marcelo then went outside and was stabbed by Rogelio on his left back part of his upper arm. He ran towards the front yard of Mrs. Olmedo and was intercepted by Marcelo who lunged at him and delivered another stabbing blow but was able to get hold of the right wrist holding the deadly weapon and wrest it from Rogelio’s hold by twisting his right hand. While Marcelo is still pinned by Rogelio against the concrete fence, Marcelo delivered two stabbing blows and pushed Rogelio who fell to the ground.

        The Court of Appeals ruled that the penalty be imposed on appellant Marcelo Jervoso, should be imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prison mayor as minimum to 12 years of prison mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso in the amount of P30,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Issue

        Whether or not the petitioners should pay the indemnity of P30,000 to the heirs of Regelio Jervoso despite the reservation by the said heirs of their right to file a separate civil action against the accused, which they did file in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Held  

        The filing of a separate civil action for damages against the accused by the heirs of the decease victim is authorized under Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 is used in generic sense. It included consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide (Majeda vs. Cruz, 126 SCRA 293, cited Vol I, p. 62 Civil Code, 1990., Ed by R.C Aquino). Having reserved and filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the award.

*****

No Need to reserve independent civil action.

Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court requires the action to be reserved;

“Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.— (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. “The Reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.”

“Section 2. Independent civil action. –– In the cases provided for in Article 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the

criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.”

“Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. –– In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.”

Note: 

·         The foundation of Article 33 is the Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that every person who is criminally liable shall also be civilly liable.

·         There is NO NEED TO RESERVE the right to prosecute the civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.

·         While the Rules of Court require reservation, what is reserved is the right to file a civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the crime charged as a felony; otherwise it is deemed filed with the criminal action.

·         The PURPOSE of RESERVING of civil action is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.

Independent civil action; when deemed not barred despite intervention by private prosecutor.

ZENAIDA CRUZ REYES vs HON. JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIO-DIY, et al.,

G.R No. L-71914, January 29, 1986  

Facts

        Cristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. The aggrieved party therein was Zenaida Cruz Reyes, the herein petitioner. In said case Zenaida Cruz Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor, Atty. Barayang. The accused pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced by the Court to a fine of P50.00. Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party was unable to present evidence to prove damages against the accused. Neither was she able to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Instead, she filed a new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the Regional Trial Court for damages arising from the defamatory words uttered against her by Cristina Malicsi which was the subject of the information filed against the latter for intriguing against honor.

        The trial Court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the civil case relying principally upon Roa vs Dela Cruz,  107 Phil 8;

When the offended party actually intervenes in the criminal action by appearing therein through a private prosecutor for the purpose of recovering indemnity for damages, he is deemed to have waived his right to file a separate civil action for damages if he failed to make a reservation therefor; thus, if the court did not enter a judgment for civil liability against the accused in the criminal case because the offended party failed to submit evidence of damages therein and he did not file any motion for reconsideration or did not appeal from said judgment, the judgment becomes res judicata, and an independent civil action under Art. 33 of the New Civil Code cannot be brought by said offended party anymore

Issue

        Whether or not the rule laid down in Roa Case should govern in dismissing the civil case filed by Zenaida Cruz Reyes.

Held

No. In the present case, however, while it is true that petitioner, the aggrieved party in the criminal case against private respondent Cristina Malicsi for the crime of intriguing against honor, was represented by a private prosecutor for the purpose of proving damages, the unexpected plea of guilt by the accused and her being sentenced immediately to a fine of P50.00 prevented petitioner from proving her claim for damages and making a reservation to file a separate civil action. More in point, therefore, is the case of Meneses vs. Luat, 12 SCRA 454, and it is the ruling in the said case rather than the Roa case which is controlling in the present case, Like in the present case in the Meneses case the aggrieved party was also represented by a private prosecutor, but the case did not proceed to trial as the accused upon arraignment pleaded guilty.

Upon authority, therefore, of Meneses vs. Luat We find and so hold that the mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private respondents did not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Because the accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in support of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil action.

Moreover, the failure of petitioner to make a reservation to file a separate civil action did not foreclose her right to file said separate complaint for damages. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for damages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case and such reservation is not necessary.

Outcome of criminal case is inconsequential.

·         ·         The outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is inconsequential and will be of no moment in a civil action for damages based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.

·        *  Civil liability may still be pursued in a separate civil action but it must be predicated on a source of obligation other than a delict, except when by statutory provision an independent civil action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil Code. 

Sources: 
Family Code of the Philippines by Judge Albano 

Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to other. (33)

-      There must be a showing that there is a death by positive evidence. However, it can be done by circumstantial evidence.

In Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil 257, where the death of the mother and her son occurred during the massacre of civilians in February 1945 and at the time when Manila was being bombarded during the war, The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the trial court which was reversed by the Court of Appeals that, from the evidence presented the son died ahead of mother.

RAMON JOAQUIN vs. ANTONIO C. NAVARRO

G.R No. L-5426, May 29, 1953

Facts

On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro Sr. aged 70, Angela Joaquin aged 67, with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad and their son Joaquin Navarro Jr. aged 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as German Club. During their stay the club was set on fire and Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, which hit the three daughters and fell of the ground near the entrance.

Joaquin Navarro Sr., his son Joaquin Navarro Jr with his wife Adela Conde, friend and former neighbor Francisco Lopez decided to abandon the premises but could not convince Angela Joaquin to join them. They dashed out of the burning edifice and as they came out, Joaquin Navarro Jr was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.

Joaquin Navarro Sr., Adela Joaquin and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby. They stayed there about three days until they are forced to leave the shelter because the shelling tore it open. But unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro Sr and his daughter-in-law.

Issue

          Whether or not Angela Joaquin Navarro died before her son Joaquin Navarro Jr or vice versa as it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin (petitioner) who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro (respondent), son of Joaquin Navarro Sr., by first marriage.

Held

The testimony of Francisco Lopez contains facts adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro Jr.  and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable interference can be arrived at, namely; that Joaquin Navarro Jr, died before his mother.

This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired

In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)

Illustration:

        A and B, father and son, died on the same day but the exact hours of their death cannot be ascertained. Then, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights, one in favor of another.

        However, if it can be established that A died ahead of B, then B can inherit from A, but since he is already dead, his heirs can represent him.

Similar presumption in Rule 131, Section 3, paragraph (jj) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

“That except for purposes of succession when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:

1)   If both were under the age of 15 years, the older is presumed to have

survived;

2) If both were above the age of 60, the younger is deemed to have        

    survived;

3)   If one is under 15 and the other above 60, the former is deemed to have survived;

4)   If both be over 15 and under 60, and the sex be different, the male is

deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;

5)   If one be under 15 or over 60, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.”

Sources: 

Family Code of the Philippines by Judge Albano

What is contract of sale with right to Purchase?

It is best defined under this provision:

Article 1601. Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves the right to repurchase the thing sold with the obligation to comply with the provision of Article 1616 and other stipulations which may have been agreed ipon. (1507)

-      It is the right which the vendor reserves to himself, to reacquire the property sold provided he returns to the vendee the price of the sale, expenses of the contract, any other legitimate payments made therefore, the necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold and fulfills other stipulations which may have been agreed upon.  

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

        [1] Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

[2] Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

          [3] Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

[4] Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

The Code of Commission rationalized the law by saying:

          “The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of laws, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If in legislation, inadequate regard is observed for human life and safety; if the laws do not sufficiently forestall human suffering or do not try effectively to curb those factors or influences that wound the noblest sentiments; if the statues insufficiently protect persons from being unjustly humiliated; in short, if human personality is not properly exalted – then laws are indeed defective.”

Scope:

[1] Prying into the privacy of another’s residence – includes by implication respect for another’s name, picture or personality except insofar as is needed for publication of information and pictures of legit

imate news value.

[2] Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another – includes alienation of the affections of the husband or the wife.

[3] Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends – includes gossiping, and reliance on hearsay.

[4] Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition – includes criticism of one’s health or features without justifiable legal course.

In St. Louis Realty Corporation v Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 179);

St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Conrado J. Aramil

G.R No. L-46061, November 14, 1984

Facts

          St Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) on the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading “WHERE THE HEART IS”. Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio Family  and then below the photograph was the following write-up:

Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family have been captured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took shape when they heard of Brookside Hills. With thrift and determination, they bought a lot and built their dream house.. for P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving community of Brookside Hills… a beautiful first-class subdivision planned for wholesome family living.

The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday times dated January 05, 1969. Doctor Aramil noticed the mistake and on the same date wrote St Louis realty a letter of protest for unauthorized use of his house for promotional gain and also damaging his prestige in the medical profession as numerous colleagues, medical students and friends’ uttered remarks purporting doubts to his professional and personal integrity.

The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped the publication of the advertisement and contacted Doctor Aramil to offer his apologies however, no rectification was published.

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 attorney’s fees as there was violation of Aramil’s right to privacy (Article 26).

St Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue

          Whether or not the case is covered by Article 26 of the civil code.

Held

          In this appeal, St Louis Realty contends that the Appellate Court ignored certain facts and resorted to surmises and conjectures. This contention is unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts found by the trial court. Those factual findings are binding on this court.

St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by Article 26 which provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief". 

The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26. 

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday times. To suit it's purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification". 

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.